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BIDDER COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST LAW:
REFINING THE ANALYSIS OF PRICE FIXING TO
ACCOUNT FOR THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF
AUCTION MARKETS
ROBERT C. MARSHALL*

MICHAEL J. MEURER**

I. INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have painstakingly analyzed antitrust policy
toward horizontal price fixing, but surprisingly, one of the most common
forms of price fixing--bidder collusion-has escaped the sustained attention of antitrust lawyers.' We attribute this inattention to the mistaken
belief that the economics of bidder collusion is essentially equivalent to
the economics of price fixing in posted-price markets. However, there
are significant differences regarding the economics of collusion in auction and procurement markets as compared to posted-price markets,
that apply specifically
and we derive antitrust policy recommendations
2
to bidder collusion in this article.
The law governing bidder collusion was settled long ago. It falls within
the ambit of the per se condemnation of agreements by horizontal
* Professor and Head, Department of Economics, Penn State University.
** Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Business, Law, & Technology, Boston

University School of Law.
We thank Jonathan Baker, Joe Brodley, Tammy Feldman, Keith Hylton, Steve Marks,
Chip Miller, Matt Raiff, Barbara White, seminar participants at the Boston University Law
and Economics Workshop, and the Antitrust and Regulation Section meeting of the AALS,
and, especially, Leslie Marx.
I For example, Hovenkamp's extensive discussion of cheating in cartels covers postedprice and negotiated-price markets but makes only brief mention of auctions. HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE

147-53 (2d ed. 1999).
2 Auctions have become increasingly popular in recent years. See Robert C. Marshall &
Michael J. Meurer, The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion, in GAME THEORY AND
BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 339, 339 (Kalyan Chatterjee & William F. Samuelson eds., 2001);
Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, 16J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 2002, at
169, 169.
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competitors to fix prices.3 Horizontal price fixing was first condemned
in United States v. Trans-MissouriFreightAssociation.4 The defendants were
competing railroads that established an association that set freight rates
for its members. The collusive agreement in this posted-price market
matches the canonical example of price fixing in antitrust treatises.5 In
posted-price markets, sellers6 specify a price or price list at which they
sell their products, and the buyers understand that the posted prices are
not negotiable. The ban against horizontal price fixing was extended to
auction and procurement markets in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States.7 The Supreme Court found bid rigging violated the Sherman Act
on a theory that evolved into the per se rule.8 The affected market in
that case was iron sewer pipe procured by local governments in sealedbid auctions. The defendants colluded by allocating territories and rigging bids.
We look back to these cases because they shed some light on an
anomalous feature of antitrust theory. Antitrust commentators see
Addyston Pipe as equivalent to Trans-Missouriin terms of anticompetitive
effect. They also see Addyston Pipe as the prototypical case of bidder
collusion. 9 Many auction and procurement markets are not very much
like the market in Addyston Pipe.And the reasoning that guides antitrust
3 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237 (1899). The per se rule
and rule of reason seem to be melding together to form a continuous standard in horizontal
restraint cases, but even under this modem treatment bid rigging is subject to "virtually
summary disposition." See William E. Kovacic, Illegal Agreements with Competitors, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 528 (1988). The following activities are considered bid rigging: joint
bidding, bid rotation, inspecting competitors' bids before the auction, territorial and
customer allocation. See id. at 530-31 .Judge Posner notes that 90% of the prison sentences
for violation of antitrust law arise in bid-rigging cases. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 44 n.29 (2d ed. 2001).
4 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
1See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 144-53.
1Posted-price markets less commonly involve buyers posting a price and facing a large
number of sellers. The best examples are labor markets.
7 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The ring first agreed on a sales price and then conducted a
private procurement exclusively among ring members, known as a knockout, to see who
would be the winner and active bidder for the ring at the auction.
8 The per se rule against price fixing was fashioned later in United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150

(1940). See KEITH N. HYLTON,
98-112 (2003).

ANTITRUST LAW: EcONOMIc THEORY AND COMMON LAW

EVOLUTION

9 See, e.g.,James L. Langenfeld & Louis Silvia, FederalTrade Commission HorizontalRestraint
Cases: An Economic Perspective, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 659 (1993) ("Addyston Pipe can be
considered the archetypical traditional collusion theory case."); POSNER, supra note 3, at
78,87 (discussion of bid rigging in sealed-bid procurements but no discussion of ascending
bid auctions); Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, Inefficiency of Collusion at English
Auctions (2004), availableat http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-marx/bio/papers.html (Antitrust enforcers heavily emphasize the threat of collusion at sealed-bid procurements but
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policy toward price fixing in cases like Trans-Missouri should not be
applied without reflection to bidder collusion cases. We address four
main points.
First, two of the most commonly employed auction schemes differ
0
greatly in terms of their susceptibility to collusion.' A first-price auction
is a sealed-bid auction in which the high bidder wins and pays the amount
of his bid. The sealed-bid procurements in Addyston Pipe were first-price
procurements. The other auction is the oral ascending bid auction, which1n
is also known as the English auction. First-price sealed-bid auctions
share many of the properties of posted-price markets in terms of their
vulnerability to collusion-it can occur, and often does, but not without
considerable cost and effort by the cartel members. By contrast, oral
ascending bid auctions are much more vulnerable to collusion. We recommend that enforcement authorities carefully scrutinize oral ascending
bid auctions for signs of collusion. 2
Several related factors make collusion harder at first-price sealed-bid
auctions than oral ascending bid auctions. A key to understanding the
difference between auction formats is the presence or absence of shading
by the bidder representing the bidding ring. At a first-price sealed-bid
auction the payoff from winning equals the gap between a bidder's
valuation of winning and his bid. The bidder gets no profit unless he
shades his bid below his valuation. A bidding ring, unconcerned about
defection, achieves greater profit for ring members by shading the ring
bids below their noncooperative level. But, this increased shading makes
the bid of the highest valuation ring member vulnerable to defection
by another ring member. In contrast, the bidder selected to win for a
ring at an oral ascending bid auction remains willing to bid up to his
valuation, leaving no room for profitable defection by another ring
13
member.
virtually ignore collusion at ascending bid auctions. One explanation is that sealed-bid
auctions leave more evidence in the form of bids by every bidder.)
10See Marc S. Robinson, Collusion and the Choice of Auction, 16 RANDJ. ECON. 141 (1985)
(conjecturing that collusion is easier to sustain at second-price than first-price auctions);
see also Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, Bidder Collusion, Proposition 1, at 15 (rev.
2004), available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-marx/bio/papers.html. In a secondprice sealed-bid auction the bidder submitting the highest bid wins and pays the amount
of the second highest bid. For simplicity, second-price sealed-bid auctions are only discussed
in footnotes.
n1Hereafter, for brevity, we usually omit the term procurement, but our comments apply
to both auctions and procurements unless we note otherwise.
12On-line descending bid procurements (sometimes called reverse auctions) are strategically equivalent to the oral ascending bid auction and share its susceptibility to collusion.
1 See Robert C. Marshall & Daniel A. Graham, Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single Object
Second-Price and English Auctions, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1217 (1987) (demonstrating collusion
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The need to shade the winning bid at a first-price auction makes it
more difficult for a ring to detect and punish defectors. As noted by
Stigler, the inability to detect deviant pricing by cartel members is the
fundamental challenge to cartel stability. 4 When there are many bidders
at an auction, some inside the ring and some outside, the ring at a firstprice sealed-bid auction has trouble detecting whether they lost at an
auction because they were genuinely outbid by a non-cartel bidder, or
alternatively, because a ring member cheated, for example, by using a
surrogate bidder at the auction.' 5 The absence of shading makes a ring
at an oral ascending bid auction less vulnerable to surrogate bids.' 6 The
greater vulnerability of rings at first-price auctions means they are similar
to posted-price markets in that collusion requires significant coordination and often leaves a substantial paper trail or other evidence of
collusion, making it easier for the antitrust enforcement agencies to
detect and punish colluding bidders.
Second, the economics of bidder collusion differs from the economics
of collusion in posted-price markets because these pricing institutions
endogenously arise from different economic environments. Posted prices
are usually found in markets with relatively simple products and numerous, anonymous, and low-volume buyers who passively take the price as
given. The market in Trans-Missouri fits this description; the railroads
posted prices for farmers and other low-volume customers who had
simple, standardized shipping needs. Although the market in Addyston
Pipe had similar characteristics (i.e., a large number of local governments
conducted small-volume procurement of relatively standardized sewer
pipe), many auctions and procurements take place in markets with informationally complex products. Examples include oil tract leases, used
machinery, electromagnetic spectrum, antiques, weapon systems, timber,
and art. Buyers and sellers need to gather and use specialized information
to evaluate the products subject to transaction. When two equally wellinformed bidders confront each other noncooperatively at an auction
they will bid out the full value of the information they have acquired.
This diminishes the incentive for noncooperative bidders to gather information. Thus, the inherent trade-off: Collusion preserves the informaat second-price and English auctions is profitable without repeated play); Marshall & Marx,
supra note 10 (presenting a formal comparison of collusion between second-price and
first-price auctions that shows the relative vulnerability of the former to bidder collusion).
'4See GeorgeJ. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
15Depending on the context, a defector might disguise his bid by using a "shill" bidder
at the auction or by secretly contracting with an outside bidder.
16The possibility that a ring member can cheat by using a shill (disguised) bid makes
collusion especially difficult at sealed-bid auctions but does not affect collusion at English
auctions. See Marshall & Marx, supra note 10.

2004]

BIDDER COLLUSION

tional rent and preserves the incentive to gather information, but once
"competitors" conspire to suppress rivalry, socially undesirable effects
follow. This trade-off should be kept in mind by courts and the antitrust
enforcement agencies as they seek to characterize the social impact of
joint bidding.' 7 In environments where there is no opportunity to pursue
a legally sanctioned joint venture, it is reasonable for the courts to
s
evaluate the merits of this trade-off.1
Third, private enforcement provides a socially valuable complement
to public enforcement. However, an important class of potential plaintiffs, non-colluding competing bidders, possibly face a standing barrier
that retards private enforcement. Antitrust law tends to disfavor suits by
competitors out of fear that a competitor's incentive to bring a suit is
19
not closely aligned with social incentives to bring a suit. Suits that are
inconsistent with antitrust policy goals are blocked by standing rules,
especially the antitrust injury doctrine. This doctrine, developed in the
context of posted-price markets, should be relaxed in certain auction
markets because non-colluding bidders sometimes have incentives to
sue that match social incentives.
Non-colluding bidders may be harmed by bidder collusion in two
ways. First, auctioneers and procurers often combat cartels by being
more aggressive in their use of reserve prices. A higher reserve price in
an auction may result in non-cartel bidders being denied an item that
they would have won in the absence of the cartel. Second, when the
commodity is informationally complex, bidder collusion may create a
better-informed bidder relative to the non-colluding bidders. Noncolluding bidders will realize that winning against better-informed colluding bidders is "bad news." Consequently, timid bidding by non-cartel
bidders implies they will lose items that they would have won in the
absence of collusion.
7

Auctioneers should also consider the impact of joint bidding on the incentive to

gather information.
18 Surprisingly, bidder collusion potentially creates two social benefits. First, it may be
a source of countervailing power at auctions run by a monopoly seller or procurements
run by a monopsony buyer. Second, it may provide necessary incentives for socially valuable
investment in information production. See Marshall & Meurer, supra note 2, at 360-61.
19See generally Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1539 (1989). This danger is great when the defendants allegedly engage in a
horizontal restraint. SeeJoseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in PrivateMerger Cases:Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1, 50 (1995) ("[W]e
normally assume that competitors will benefit from collusion in their market . . ").
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which competitors do meet the standing requirements to bring a suit challenging a horizontal restraint. See id. at 46, 49-50 (competitors
may face exclusionary tactics from new firms created by a merger, and thus may be suitable
antitrust plaintiffs).
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Finally, recognizing that optimal antitrust enforcement cannot deter
all bidder collusion, auctioneers should account for the risk of collusion
when designing an auction. Focusing on government timber and mobile
phone spectrum auctions, we identify factors that should guide government agencies when they choose an auction or procurement method.
We explain that auction design calls for difficult trade-offs: although
ascending bid auctions create a greater risk of collusion, they have social
welfare advantages over sealed-bid auctions that might offset the risk.
II. COMPARISON OF COLLUSION IN POSTED-PRICE,
FIRST-PRICE SEALED-BID AUCTION, AND ENGLISH
AUCTION MARKETS
In this section we explain why oral ascending bid auctions tend to be
more susceptible to collusion than first-price sealed-bid auctions or
posted-price markets. There are two issues antitrust economists recognize
as relevant to an analysis of bidder collusion. First, collusion might be
easier to sustain in auction markets because prices and quantities are
easily observed. This transparency encourages collusion because it makes
cheating more difficult.20 Second, collusion at an oral ascending bid
auction is facilitated by the opportunity for the ring to respond to deviant
behavior while the auction is still in progress. Instead, we emphasize a
different issue-oral ascending bid auctions are more susceptible to
collusion than first-price sealed-bid auctions because of the differences
21
in the payment rule for each.
A.

COLLUSION IN POSTED-PRICE MARKETS

Besides the hazard of antitrust litigation, firms face other obstacles to
collusion in posted-price markets. They may have trouble agreeing on
a collusive price or how to divide a market. However, the most difficult
obstacle arises because cartel members are tempted to cheat on cartel
rules by exceeding their output quota and undercutting the collusive
0 For example, Hovenkamp notes the transparency in typical auction markets and
concludes: "Cheating is most difficult (and cartels therefore most successful) in auction
markets..." HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 150.
21 There is little difference between the first-price sealed-bid and the second-price sealedbid auctions (defined supra note 10) in terms of transparency and the opportunity to
respond to deviant behavior in real time. Nevertheless, the second-price sealed-bid auction
shares essentially the same susceptibility to collusion as the oral ascending bid auction.
Note that the price paid at an oral ascending bid auction is the amount at which the
second-highest valuing bidder drops out, and that this is the same as the price paid
at the second-price auction (up to a bid increment). These comparisons highlight the
importance of the payment rule as opposed to transparency and real-time response capability for the susceptibility of an auction scheme to collusive bidding.
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price. 22 A cheater hopes to gain the benefit from the high cartel price
by drawing customers away from other cartel members by offering discounts to buyers. In markets that last a single period or have a brief
duration, the temptation to cheat is inexorable: cheating is the most
profitable strategy for each firm regardless of what rival firms do.
Repeated interaction is usually necessary to overcome the temptation to
cheat because repetition encourages cartel members to trust each other23
any cheaters.
to obey cartel rules and gives members a chance to punish
is detected. 24
cheating
after
Of course, cheaters can only be punished
the
Even for cartels operating in multiple periods for long durations,
25
possibility of secret price concessions makes collusion precarious.
B.

COLLUSION AT ENGLISH (ASCENDING BID) AUCTIONS

Ex ante, collusion is successful if the ring's expected payment for an
item is reduced compared to non-collusive bidding. At an English auction
the ring's expected payment is depressed by suppressing the bids of all
ring members except the one with highest valuation. The ring member
with highest valuation continues to bid as he did noncooperatively. This
leaves no room for cheating by ring members without the highest valuation, and implies that English auctions are especially vulnerable to collusion. In contrast, bidding rings at first-price sealed-bid auctions face a risk26
markets.
of cheating similar to the risk faced by cartels in posted-price
See Stigler, supra note 14.
Punishment strategies used to enforce cartel prices are described in Ian Ayres, How
Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 295 (1987).
A famous result in game theory known as the Folk Theorem establishes the link between
repetition and collusion. The Folk Theorem (so named because it was known to many
economists before it was formally stated), when applied to the environment considered
herein, holds that if bidders at an auction are sufficiently patient, if auctions are repeated
indefinitely, and if enough information is revealed to bidders at the end of each auction,
then collusion is an equilibrium. The value of repetition is that it discourages cheating.
A potential cheater can earn a short-run gain from cheating until his cheating is detected.
Detection leads to punishment by the cartel and the loss of the long-term benefits from
collusion. For a sufficiently patient bidder the long-term gains of collusion will outweigh
the short-term gains from cheating, and cheating is deterred.
24 Actually, cartels can ward off secret output expansion by responding to a decline in
the market price with a generalized punishment phase consisting of competitive pricing.
See Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price
22

23

Information, 52

ECONOMETRICA

87 (1984).

more condition usually necessary for collusion is that firms are sufficiently patient.
A firm can be deterred from cheating today by the threat of future punishment, but that
threat is not typically effective against an impatient firm that heavily discounts future profit
compared to current profit.
26 See Marshall & Marx, supra note 10 (formal comparison of collusion between secondand first-price auctions); Robinson, supra note 10 (collusion easier to sustain at secondprice than first-price auctions).
25 One
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To build some intuition about collusion at auctions we start with a
simple example. Suppose there are three bidders, X, Y, and Z ready to
participate in an English (oral ascending bid) auction. Bidder X has a
valuation of 5, bidder Yhas a valuation of 4, and bidder Zhas a valuation
of 3, the bidders know each other's valuation, 27 but the auctioneer only
knows the distributions from which the bidders draw their valuations.
If the bidders do not collude, then X will win the auction and pay 4.
Bidders Y and X remain active in the English auction until the bidding
reaches 4, at which time bidder Y drops out and bidder X wins.
Now consider what happens if various sets of bidders collude. First,
suppose the pair X and Z, or the pair Y and Z, collude; neither of these
collusive rings has an effect on the auction outcome. In either case,
bidder Xwins and pays a price of 4. An effective ring must contain the
two high valuation bidders, X and Y If X and Y form a ring but Z is
excluded, then X will win the item for a bid of 3. The auctioneer's
revenue falls from 4 to 3, and there is a collusive gain of 1. X has to
beat non-colluding bidder Z and persuade bidder Y not to bid, or at
least bid nothing above 3. Any split of the collusive gain makes both Xand
Y better off, because Ygets nothing in the absence of the bidding ring. 28
Finally, consider a collusive agreement that involves all three bidders. 29
Xwould win the item at a cost of zero, leaving nothing for the auctioneer
and a collusive gain of 4 for the ring. Any division of the collusive gain
between the three bidders gives them each an incentive to participate.30
As before, no one has an incentive to cheat because no one can profitably
31
win against X at the auction.

2 Our main results carry through to the case in which valuations are private information.
28Outside the ring, Y cannot profitably compete against X because X would always be
willing to bid higher than Y.
2 Bidding rings sometimes succeed despite exclusion of potential members. See infra
text accompanying notes 95-100.
31This choice is arbitrary; any division of the collusive gain that provides a positive
payoff to each (beyond non-collusive payoffs) is consistent with individual rationality on
the part of the bidders.
31In the last example, it seems implausible that the all-inclusive ring could really acquire
an item at a price of zero from the auctioneer. More plausibly, an auctioneer would set
a reserve price before the auction, or simply reserve the right to refuse to award the item.
A reserve price is a preannounced minimum acceptable bid. An auctioneer selects a reserve
based on his knowledge of the bidders' distributions and on his knowledge about the
probability of collusion.
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C. COLLUSION AT SEALED-BID AUCTIONS

Incentives to cheat at a first-price sealed-bid auction are more similar
to the incentives present in posted-price markets3 2 Continuing our example, non-collusive bidding at the sealed-bid auction yields the same outcome as at the English auction: X would submit a bid of 4 and win the
auction. Suppose instead that X and Ycollude. The maximum collusive
gain occurs if X submits a bid of 3. The winning bid would fall from 4
to 3, and the ring would realize a collusive gain of 1. But unlike the
English auction, Y has a strong incentive to cheat in the sealed-bid
auction. Y could submit a bid just above 3, and capture a payoff just
below 1. A side payment to Y must be as least as large as the gain from
deviant behavior in order to dissuade deviant behavior-but then X
would be paying Yalmost the entirety of the gain from collusive behavior.
If there are costs to collusion, then Xwould not find collusion profitable.
X is vulnerable to cheating because she must shade her bid below her
valuation in order to capture surplus from the auction. At an oral ascending bid auction the highest valuation cartel member does not need to
shade her bid; in fact, she bids exactly as she would had no cartel
ever formed.
Collusion at a one-shot sealed-bid auction is difficult to sustain; usually
repeated play is required to achieve collusion.33 The requirements for
successful collusion are about the same as those for collusion in postedprice markets. Bidders should be patient, they should plan to participate
in the cartel for some time into the future, and they should believe that
the auction will be repeated regularly. It is also important that cheating
is detectable. If a cheating bidder uses a shill bidder to avoid detection,
the cartel might not be able to identify the cheater or even know that
32 For a discussion of bidder collusion at sealed-bid highway construction procurement
auctions, see JTC Petroleum Co. v. PiasaMotor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1999)
(standardized service, defection from collusion is easy to detect and punish). The Dutch
auction, the open outcry equivalent of a first-price auction, is used in Holland and other
countries to sell agricultural products. At a Dutch auction the price declines from a high
initial price until a bidder stops and wins the auction and pays the amount indicated on
the dial. The discriminatory auction is a version of a first-price auction when multiple
items are sold simultaneously. An article by Vickrey (cited by the Nobel Prize committee)
shows that the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auction are strategically equivalent. See
William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16J. FIN. 8, 20
(1961). Thus, the issues discussed in this section pertain to the Dutch auction as well.
11See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 172 (frequently repeated auctions are more vulnerable
to collusion). Collusion can be sustained at a one-shot sealed-bid auction if a cartel member
can use the threat of litigation to induce side-payments. See Robert C. Marshall, Michael
J. Meurer & Jean-Frangois Richard, Litigation Settlement and Collusion, 109 Q.J. ECON. 213
(1994).
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cheating has occurred.34 Furthermore, the cartel should have stable membership. If participants come and go, they will not have the long-term
stake in collusion that is required to deter cheating. At the English
auction these factors are less relevant because collusion can be sustained
even though some bidders are short-term and impatient. Cheating is
difficult to hide. As we described in the one-shot setting, the cartel will
remain active up to the highest valuation of any member-this offers
protection against cheating whether the auction is repeated or not. 5
D. ENTRY
A standard lesson in microeconomics is that supranormal profit, in
the absence of barriers, attracts entry to the market. In addition to
stopping cheating, successful cartels will have an incentive to block entry.
Without entry barriers, firms will enter the collusive market seeking a
share of the supranormal profit. Entry barriers might arise from increasing returns, governmental action (e.g., a patent grant), or as the result
of actions by cartel members that deter entry.3 6 Exclusionary conduct
that deters entry is much easier at English auctions than at sealed-bid
37
auctions. A simple example shows why.

Suppose that bidders X, Y, and Z share the same valuation of 6 for
an item available at an English auction. Suppose that X and Y invest a
sunk cost to enter the auction and then form a bidding ring. Suppose
that Z is considering entry into the auction and must sink a payment of
2.5 to enter. If Zdoes not enter, then Xand Ywill earn a collusive profit
of 6. If Z enters the market, joins the ring, and receives an equal share
of the collusive gain, the payoff of 2 would not be sufficient to cover

the cost of entry. Nor could Z enter the market and bid against the ring.
Competition between Z and the ring would drive the bid up to 6 and
all profit would disappear.
Colluding bidders at a sealed-bid auction face more pressure from a
potential entrant. Continuing the example, Z can compete effectively
with the ring at a sealed-bid auction. Suppose that X and Y cannot
observe whether Zmakes the investment required for entry, so they must

guard against competition from Z. The ring can deter entry if they
34See Marshall & Marx, supranote 10 (the impact of shill bidders on viability of collusion
is examined for both second-price and first-price auctions).
35A threat to bidder collusion at English auctions comes from the strategic response of
the auctioneer. We will discuss auctioneer responses in detail infra Part V.
36For an example of alleged exclusionary conduct by colluding bidders at a sealed-bid
auction, see JTC Petroleum, 190 F.3d at 777-79.
37This example is drawn from Marshall & Meurer, supra note 2, at 347-48.
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commit to bid 3.5, but this reduces their collusive gain to 2.5. If the ring
bids 0 in an attempt to collect the entire collusive gain, then Z can
submit an arbitrarily small positive bid, win the item, and more than
cover the cost of entry. The equilibrium strategy for the ring balances
these two objectives and implements a mixed strategy with bids ranging
from 0 to 3.5. Bidder Zwill stay out of the auction with some probability
and with the complementary probability Z will enter the market and
submit a bid over the same range. The details of the equilibrium are
not important. 38 What matters is that the expected profit of the ring falls
because of the threat of entry. Since the ring must shade its bid to earn
a profit, it becomes vulnerable to entry in much the same way it is
vulnerable to cheating.
The above analysis presumes that the potential entrant knows of the
ring. It also presumes that the ring can continue to function without
detection by enforcement authorities. How reasonable are these presumptions? We advance two arguments in support of them. First, the
members of any industry know the production process, costs, and
demand better than a government enforcement agent. Potential entrants
usually do not emerge from the ranks of the completely uninformed
but produce related products and are well aware of what might be
involved with entry. Second, when the threat of entry looms it would
not be unreasonable for members of a cartel to approach the entrant
to buy them out, dissuade them from entry, or invite them into the
cartel, depending on circumstances. In other words, intra-industry communication might plausibly occur that could be hidden from an enforcement agency.
III. BIDDER COLLUSION AND PRIVATE INFORMATION
The nature and feasibility of collusion and its welfare effects depend,39
among other things, on the private information held by cartel members.
If cartel members truthfully reveal their private information to each
other, this greatly aids the cartel's ability to maximize the gains from
collusion. But the desire of cartel members to maximize their individual
profit discourages truthful revelation. Self-interest motivates cartel memm The ring's equilibrium strategy has a mass point at 0. Z's equilibrium calls for Z to
stay out with a probability equal to the ratio of the sunk cost to the value of the item. If
Z enters, then she draws her bid from a distribution with no mass points over the interval
from 0 to 3.5. The entrant gets zero expected profit. The ring gets an expected profit of
2.5. See id. at n.23.
39 See generally Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, Optimal Collusion with PrivateInformation, 32
RANDJ. ECON. 428 (2001).
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bers to distort information disclosure and causes cartels to make inefficient output decisions.

40

Private information presents similar efficiency challenges for colluding
bidders.41 An efficient bidding ring typically extracts private information
from ring members to assure that the winning bidder has the highest
value for an auctioned item, or the lowest production cost in a procurement setting. 42 Also, a ring uses the information to bid effectively against
non-colluding bidders, 43 and in some contexts the information can be
used to guide investment decisions related to efficient exploitation of
an auctioned item. 44
Economists typically distinguish two private information auction environments: common values and independent private values. 45 In a common values environment bidders share a common but unknown true
value for the auctioned item-they receive different private signals about
the value. Similarly situated oil exploration companies would share a
common value for rights to explore for oil on a particular tract, but they
would receive disparate private signals about the value of the tract from
their geologists. In contrast, art collectors are apt to hold independent
valuations for a work of art; the valuations arise from introspection and,
thus, are private. In practice, most auctions mix the features of the
common values and independent private values environments; for example, the possibility of resale introduces a common values element into
art auctions, and variation in drilling costs introduces an independent
private values element into oil tract auctions.
Ideally, we would offer policy advice strongly linked to the distinction
between common and independent private values. 46 Life would be easier
40 See Susan Athey, Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, Collusion and PriceRigidity, 71 REv.
ECON. STUD. 317 (2004) (firms do not adjust cartel prices efficiently in response to privately
observed fluctuations in firms' costs).
"1 SeeKen Hendricks, Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse:
The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions, (June 19, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.papers.nber.org/papers/W9836) (Information revelation necessary for efficient collusion is harder to achieve in common value settings than
in private value settings. Bidders who have received a good signal are reluctant to participate
in a ring because the cost of making payments to fellow ring members outweighs the
benefit of a smaller payment to the auctioneer.); R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan,
Bidding Rings, 82 Am. ECON. REV. 579 (1992) (designing a mechanism that supports
information disclosure within an all-inclusive ring).
12See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 41 at 583-84.
43 See Hendricks et al., supra note 41, at 23.
44See id. at 3.
45See, e.g., Marshall & Meurer, supra note 2, at 343.
46
Economists continue to develop econometric techniques to distinguish common values
from independent private-value auctions. See, e.g., Philip A. Haile, Han Hong & Matthew
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for example, if we could assert that collusion is more likely in one of
the two environments, or if the social welfare costs of collusion were more
severe in one of the environments. Unfortunately, neither theoretical nor
empirical research on bidder collusion points to strong distinctions,
though much work needs to be done. Nevertheless, we can present some
useful insights into the nature of bidder collusion that hinge on the
distinction between common and independent private values.
The existence of the "winner's curse" in common values auctions is
a notable strategic difference between the two informational environments. 7 The label "winner's curse" arose because unsophisticated bidders were cursed by winning a common values auction if they failed to
adjust their bid downward to account for the "bad news" of winning.
Winning is bad news in the sense that the winning bidder has received
the most favorable signal about the value of the auctioned item. A
sophisticated bidder avoids the winner's curse by recognizing that winning means all other bidders received less favorable signals, so she should
adjust her expected valuation and bid accordingly. In contrast, winning
does not reveal information in the independent private values environment because valuations are independent; therefore, there is no winner's curse.
Collusion by a subset of bidders can strengthen or weaken the effect
of the winner's curse. The winner's curse affects poorly informed bidders
more severely than well-informed bidders. It is possible the winner's
curse is so severe that poorly informed bidders get zero expected profit,
and they are discouraged from participating in the auction.Joint bidding
helps poorly informed bidders and encourages entry if they can pool
their information to mitigate the winner's curse. 4s At the other extreme,
a well-informed bidder may be reluctant to share her advantage by
Shum, Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. w10105 (Nov. 2003), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0105 (identifying common values at first-price auctions
by detecting the presence of a winner's curse).
" See Paul R. Milgrom & RobertJ. Weber, The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction,
10J. MATH. ECON. 105 (1982); Paul R. Milgrom, RationalExpectations,InformationAcquisition,

and Competitive Bidding, 49 ECONOMETRICA 921 (1981).
48Hendricks, Porter, and Tan study certain federal off-shore oil tract lease auctions that
have a strong common values component. Their data are drawn from a time when bidders
were allowed to bidjointly. They found relatively little joint bidding, and mostjoint bidding
was by pairs of bidders even though there were twelve major bidders. See Hendricks et
al., supra note 41, at 25 (almost 90% of the joint bids involved pairs and the remaining
joint bids involved triplets). The joint bids were negotiated after firms acquired their
private information. The authors infer that joint bidders drew relatively discouraging
signals about the value of the tract. See id. at 8.
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colluding with a poorly informed bidder, 49 but may be eager to collude
with another well-informed bidder.50 In particular, two fully informed
bidders will dissipate all of their informational rents if they bid against
each other at a common values auction; they can potentially preserve
51
their rents by colluding.
Problems created by private information present a nontrivial challenge
for bidding rings, but the success of a bidding ring that was prosecuted
in United States v. Seville IndustrialMachinery Corp. shows colluding bidders
can overcome these problems.5 2 Machinery dealers operated a bidding
ring for many years at used machinery auctions in the New York City
metropolitan area. 5 Dealers of used machinery possess significant expertise. They know demand conditions, and they make extensive investments
in understanding who has what kinds of machines for sale and at what
price. In addition, by inspecting a used machine tool they can determine
its remaining productive life. This information allows a machinery dealer
to resell a machine tool to a firm that values it highly.
The core membership of the ring, a group consisting of the seven or
eight wealthiest and most knowledgeable dealers in the area, was in place
prior to the announcement of any auction. Upon announcement of an
auction, the ring would expand to include other dealers. If dealers came
to the auction from out of town they would immediately be invited to
join the ring. Dealers were heterogeneous in terms of their knowledge
of machine tools and their wealth. The least knowledgeable and poorest
49See Hendricks et al., supra note 41, at 25 ("Shell had a reputation as being better
informed than other major bidders"; they rarely participated in joint bids.) Hendricks,
Porter, and Tan show that an all-inclusive ring is not feasible in a common values setting
when the tract is not too valuable, information gathering cost is high, and the number
of bidders is small. See id. at 22.
50
Treasury auctions are more appropriately modeled in a common values framework.
The dealers are mainly intermediaries, and they resell most of the securities they acquire
at the auction. See V.V. Chari & Robert J. Weber, How the U.S. Treasury Should Auction Its
Debt, Q. REv. FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 10 (1992). Since dealers' valuations ultimately
depend in large part on the demand of the same buyers, their valuations are correlated;
valuations differ because dealers hold different orders, and they differ in their interpretation of publicly observable economic data. Bidders are asymmetric, the most effective'
bidders are better informed about future securities prices, and the less-informed bidders
face an aggravated winner's curse. Empirical evidence confirms that bidders earn informational rents at Treasury auctions. See Elizabeth B. Cammack, Evidence on Bidding Strategies
and the Information in Treasury Bill Auctions, 99J. POL. ECON. 100, 113 (1991).
11See infta text accompanying notes 95-100.

1 696 F. Supp. 986, 993 (D.N.J. 1988).
53Much of this discussion is based upon the descriptive sections of Daniel A. Graham
& Robert C. Marshall, Bidder Collusion at Auctions (Duke Univ. Dep't of Econ. Working
Paper, 1984). See generally United States v. Seville Indus. Mach. Corp., 696 F. Supp. 986
(D.N.J. 1988).

2004]

BIDDER COLLUSION

of the dealers in the coalition were known as "schleppers" and were
treated differently within the ring.
Before an auction, dealers would individually inspect the machines
for sale at a preview. The issues of how to share information within the
ring and how to bid at the auction were resolved differently before and
after 1970.
Pre-1970. There was one machinery dealer who dominated the coalition. This individual, Sam (name changed), would have a meeting of
ring members before the auction to review each item being sold at the
auction. At this meeting ring members were asked to report whether or
not they were interested in an item. An expression of interest was all
that was required. No ring member was asked to state how much they
would be willing to pay, or provide any other similar information. At
the auction no ring member would bid except Sam. Sam would only bid
on items that were of interest to members of the ring. All items won by
Sam were the property of the ring. Individual ownership and distribution
of the collusive gain occurred via an auction conducted by the coalition
after the main auction. This secondary auction was called a "knockout."
Post-1970. Sam left the machinery business and there was no one of
sufficient dominance to replace him. Consequently, the coalition
adopted new operating rules. Absolutely no information was shared
ahead of time by members of the coalition, not even statements of
interest. Instead, ring members would just bid on items at the main
auction. Only one rule had to be followed: If a fellow ring member was
actively bidding, then no other ring member could bid against him. If
the active ring bidder dropped out of the bidding, then any ring member
could enter the bidding. Any item won by a member of the ring was
54
property of the ring and had to be brought up for sale at the knockout.
After the main auction, all items purchased by members of the coalition were offered for sale, by means of an oral ascending bid auction,
to members of the coalition.5 5 At the knockout, bids would be submitted
54 An interesting feature of the post-1970 bidding mechanism is the way it respects the
privacy of members' bidding intentions. The rules did not require anyone to reveal
information before the auction. The ring's active bidder at the main auction only revealed
what he would have revealed by bidding noncooperatively. It might seem that by bidding
at the main auction the ring member has conveyed information to other ring members
that will be used against him at the knockout. However, if that same bidder had let another
ring member win the item for the coalition at the main auction, the moment he bids at
the knockout he would convey at least as much about his willingness to pay as by winning
the item for the coalition at the main auction. The emphasis on keeping one's information
private reflects the fact that the ring members want to preserve the rents to the investments
in attaining their specific expertise.
1- Seville Indus. Mach., 696 F. Supp. at 993.
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as a "bonus" above the price paid for the item at the main auction. 6
The ring member with the largest bonus bid would win the item. His
bonus bid would be recorded by the ring accountant. To understand
payments at the knockout, suppose the ring purchased only one item
at the main auction. Then the winner of the knockout would pay the
purchase price from the main auction to whoever initially bought the
item. In addition, the knockout winner would put his bonus bid "in the
hat." The hat money would then be equally distributed among all ring
members, including the winner of the knockout.5 7 If the ring purchased
more than one item, then the process would continue until all items
were sold at the knockout. The ring's accountant would notify each
bidder what they owed net to the hat or would receive net from the hat.
Some rings were a mix of wealthy, knowledgeable dealers, and poorer,
less-informed dealers. In such cases the wealthy expert dealers would
form a ring within the ring. 8 Members of the inner ring would not bid
against one another at the first knockout. All other aspects of the first
knockout, the bidding and distribution of "hat" money, would be just
as described above. After the first knockout was completed, any items
won by the inner ring would then be sold amongst themselves via another
knockout. By not bidding against one another at the first knockout, the
inner ring preserved a large portion of its informational rents. Remarkably, there were cases in which a sequence of more than two knockouts
occurred (called "nested knockouts"). 9 One ring bidder recalled an
auction where there were seven levels of nesting of rings (requiring
seven knockouts).60
56In the pre-1970 era Sam occasionally paid too much for an item. Then there would
be no bonus bids. Instead, there would be loss bidding. The winner's contribution to the
hat would be negative by the amount of the winning loss bid. In the post-1970 era loss
bidding did not occur because if there were no bonus bids the item would be awarded
to the ring member who had won the item for the coalition at the main auction.
57So if his bonus bid were X and there were k members of the coalition he would end
up paying out only X (k-1)/k. Of course, the actual payout would be accounted for by
all bidders in determination of their bidding strategies.
58The mechanism used by the dealers' ring to accomplish successful collusion has an
elegant feature. The nested knockout rewards ring bidders according to the marginal
contribution that they make to the ring, averaged over all the possible ways that they could
have joined the coalition. Amazingly, this means that the collusive rents were apportioned
to ring members in accordance with their Shapley value, their average marginal contribution to the cartel. See Daniel A. Graham, Robert C. Marshall & Jean-Fran~ois Richard,
Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value, 80 AM. ECON. REv.

493 (1990).
59Frequently, there were several levels of nested knockouts. Seville Indus. Mach., 696

F. Supp. at 993.
60Actually, there were only six. At the start of the first knockout, which was attended
by all 300+ of the colluding bidders, Sam announced that all "schleppers" should come
forward, collect their $50, and leave. Approximately 50 individuals complied.
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The description of the used-machinery bidding ring nicely illustrates
the differences between collusion in typical posted-price markets and
collusion in an auction market featuring heterogeneous bidders and
informationally complex goods. The ring displayed amazing durability
despite changing membership, constant competition from outside the
ring, and countermeasures by suspicious auctioneers. We see this as
testament to the powerful pro-collusion incentives created by the English
auction. The structure of the ring with its nested knockouts provides
evidence that collusion was motivated and shaped (in part) by the desire
to protect informational advantages. The knockout auctions are also an
interesting demonstration of the ingenuity a ring can use in its quest
for an efficient assignment of goods within the ring.
IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
A.

THE SOCIAL WELFARE EFFECTS OF COLLUSION

At first glance, the social harm from bidder collusion is not evident.
If an auctioneer has a fixed supply to dispose of, then the effect of
collusion is simply a transfer of wealth from the parties represented by
the auctioneer to the collusive bidders. This analysis is too simplistic
though. First, organizing a bidding ring and the costs of litigating collusion are an obvious social loss. Second, if collusion depresses the expected
return from an auction sale, then the number of items brought to auction
61
will fall and output will be inefficiently restricted. If collusion raises
the expected cost of procurement, that will also inefficiently restrict
output as the demand for procured products will fall. Recalling the
prevalence of government auctions and procurements, we see a third
source of inefficiency caused by bidder collusion. The transfer of wealth
away from a government auction deprives society of a relatively efficient
source of revenue that may be replaced by a less efficient source. Simiattributable to collusion increase the
larly, increased procurement costs
62
burden from distortionary taxes.
The social costs of collusion may be offset in some cases by social
benefits from collusion. 63 For example, in a common values auction
61Keith N. Hylton & Mark Lasser, Measuring Market Power When the Firm Has Power in the
Input and Output Markets, in ECONOMIC INPUTS, LEGAL OUTPUTS: THE ROLE OF ECONOMISTS
IN MODERN ANTITRUST 131, 137-38 (Fred S. McChesney ed., 1998) (discussing the inter-

action of power in input and output markets and the implications for antitrust policy).
62For a general discussion of the social costs and benefits of collusion, see MICHAL S.
GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 161-64 (2003).
63Besides the informational benefits of collusion at common values auctions, collusion
might be a socially valuable source of countervailing power when the auctioneer has
market power. See Marshall & Meurer, supra note 2, at 356-59. Intuitively, collusion by
bidders gives them power to resist the market power of the auctioneer and possibly create
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a single bidder with better information than other bidders enjoys an
informational rent. This rent provides an incentive to invest in information gathering. If two bidders both have superior information to other
bidders because they have access to the same information, then they will
compete away the informational rent at the auction. The rent can be
restored if the bidders collude. Thus, collusion may provide a socially
valuable incentive because it rewards firms that invest in information
production. 64 Social value, however, depends on whether the information
is actually socially useful and whether the expected cost of redundant
65
investment outweighs the possible social benefit of the information.
Privately valuable information lacks social value when it helps one bidder
gain surplus from other bidders and the auctioneer, but does not offer
any allocative or productive gain. 66 For example, information that a used
car up for auction has $1,000 in the glove compartment is privately
valuable information, but it has no social value. In contrast, information
about the amount of oil present under a particular off-shore oil tract
has immediate value in forming a profitable bid, but it also has potential
productive value in guiding efficient extraction of the oil. In another
example, information that a particular used machine matches the needs
of a particular factory provides social value because it helps guide the
machine to the highest-value user.
Collusion by poorly informed bidders can also provide social benefits.
If poorly informed bidders can improve the quality of their information
by bidding jointly, then they can mitigate the winner's curse, which is a
particular problem for poorly informed bidders. The main social benefit
67
is more aggressive bidding, which increases revenue to the auctioneer.
The revenue gain is likely greatest when the bidders would not have
participated in the auction without the joint bid.6
a bilateral monopoly that generates more surplus than the original market structure with
a monopoly auctioneer (or monopsony procurer). Id. Unfortunately, countervailing power
does not necessarily lead to an increase in output or surplus. Id.
6 Collusion might also create social value by discouraging wasteful investment.
65See Marshall & Meurer, supra note 2, at 352.
Id. at 360-61.
67By itself, a revenue gain to the auctioneer is not socially beneficial-it isjust a transfer.
However, if collusion depresses auctioneer revenue, it will result in fewer units being
brought to the market in the future. The consequent supply reduction is a social loss.
Also, in the public sector context, a reduction in revenue from the sale potentially implies
that distortionary taxes will be increasingly used to make up the shortfall.
6 See id. at 353 (collusion to overcome informational disadvantage raises revenue).
However, Hendricks et al., supranote 41, at 4, provide empirical evidence thatjoint bidding
(even though legal during the interval covered by their data) is rare on offshore oil tracts

2004]

BIDDER COLLUSION

B.

ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES

Despite a longstanding commitment to aggressive enforcement, bid
rigging continues to be a problem. 69 Better deterrence requires an
increase in the expected sanctions faced by colluding bidders. Although
improving detection of bidder collusion will be difficult, we propose
increasing expected sanctions by increasing the probability of detect70
ing collusion.
Antitrust enforcers have trouble monitoring markets to detect collusion, 71 and, typically, public enforcement starts with a tip from an affected
party72 or an insider. 73 Recognizing the importance of private monitoring, 74 the DOJ adopted leniency programs in the 1990s to encourage
where the risk of a dry hole is high and the winner's curse is more severe. Ironically, these
are the auctions for which information sharing is most valuable.
69Ellen F. Kandell, Pennsylvania's Anti-Rigging Act: A First Step Towards an Antitrust Law
or the Only Step?, 30 VILL. L. REV. 63, 63 (1985). In the 1980s states were plagued by bid
rigging in highway construction projects. Id. at 63-64. Many states have specific bid-rigging
statutes. Id. at 63. Under the parens patriae doctrine, state attorneys general have standing
to represent taxpayers in their states in bid-rigging cases Id. at 88-89. But see Klemperer,
supranote 2, at 183 (noting European authorities have allowed joint bidding that appears
to be plainly collusive). Many states have specific bid-rigging statutes. Id. at 88, 90.
10See Chantale LaCasse, Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution, 26 RAND J.
EcoN. 398 (1995) (analyzing a model in which colluding bidders adjust their behavior in
response to strategic detection efforts by antitrust enforcers); Douglas D. Davis & BartJ.
Wilson, Collusion in Procurement Auctions: An ExperimentalExamination, 40 ECON. INQUIRY
213 (2002). Because cheating and entry are unlikely at English auctions, there is potentially
less evidence in English auction price data than one could find in other collusive markets.
At any type of auction, a sophisticated and stable ring has significant latitude to generate
winning and losing bids that disguise collusion. Further difficulties are created by the fact
that the identity of potential bidders and the make-up of bidding rings often change in
different parts of the country or as different items are auctioned.
71 See William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Informants
to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 766, 774 (2001).
72
Davis & Wilson, supra note 70, at 213 ("Tip-offs or complaints frequently expose
conspiracies, but good reasons exist for suspecting that conspiracies detected in this fashion
tend to be the least profitable.").
7
1Disgruntled employees and colluders have made complaints that prompted investigations. See General Accounting Office, Justice Department: Changes in Antitrust Enforcement
Policiesand Activities, GGD-91-2, 49 (Oct. 29, 1990). In a timber industry case a conspirator
was promised logs in exchange for suppression of his bid, but the logs were never delivered
and he alerted authorities about the collusion. United States v. Walker, 653 F.2d 1343,
1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
74Officials who run public procurements and auctions also are important potential
monitors, provided that training and incentives are provided for public officials to detect
collusion. Self-help measures available to private parties may not be available to public
officials who are constrained by requirements that public procurements and auctions are
relatively transparent.
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insiders to provide tips about collusion.7 5 William Kovacic proposed a
76
bounty program as another step in that direction.
The DOJ has embraced investigative techniques, such as wiretapping
and electronic surveillance, to improve cartel detection.7 7 Looking to
the future, Patrick Bajari and Garrett Summers describe advances in
econometric methods for identifying collusion through examination of
bid data. 78 These detection tools can be used to follow up tips and to
watch markets with a history of collusion, but they also should be used to
routinely monitor auction markets for evidence of collusion. 79 Antitrust
enforcers should devote more resources to the task of identifying auction

75See Kovacic, supranote 71, at 787 (leniency programs encourage insiders to tip public
enforcers to the existence of a cartel). In Part IV we study the incentives of competitors
to challenge bidder collusion and identify conditions such that private and social incentives
are likely to align.
76 See id. at 766-68; see also Steven P. Schulenberg, Essays in Auctions and Collusion ch. 4
(Ph.D. dissertation, Penn State University, 2003), available at http://etda.libraries.psu.edu/
theses/approved/WorldWidelndex/ETD-388. Private monitors can improve cartel detection, but steps should be taken to prevent bounty hunters from misusing the program.
Kovacic discusses safeguards against misuse of bounties. Kovacic, supra note 71, at 793-95.
77See Judy Whalley, Priorities and Practices-The Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement
Program, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 571-72 (1988).
78Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, Detecting Collusion in ProcurementAuctions, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 143, 144 (2002). See a/soJonathan B. Baker, New Horizons in CartelDetection, 69
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 827-28 (2001) (describing new econometric tools for detecting
bidder collusion); see Marshall & Marx, supra note 10 (explaining that close non-winning
bids provide evidence of collusion at an independent private values, first-price sealed-bid
auction). Even with excellent data on market characteristics it can be difficult to detect
collusion. One reason is that collusion may be ineffective. By ineffective we mean that
the ring's strategic behavior does not alter the price paid for the commodity relative to
noncooperative behavior. If the ring reduces the price paid, then it is effective. Note that
this will include cases where the coalition does not win the object but where the winning
non-ring bidder alters his strategic bidding behavior in response to collusion by others.
Identification of colluders is complicated by the possibility of "tanking." A ring may find
it advantageous not to bid at all or bid unaggressively in early rounds of an auction so as
to remove high-valuation non-ring bidders from the competition for items that will be
offered later. Without undertaking this strategic action the high-valued non-ring bidders
will oppose them on all items and force up the price paid. But, this implies that highvalued non-ring bidders will win items at depressed prices. In other words, the fact that
a given bidder wins at a depressed price may not imply that the bidder is participating in
a coalition.
"IWe doubt that over-deterrence is much of a problem in the area of bidder collusion.
See Baker, supra note 78, at 826 (stating there is no evidence that aggressive enforcement
against cartels has chilled legitimate behavior, such as joint venture formation); but see
Athey & Bagwell, supra note 39, at 432 ("[A] ntagonistic antitrust policy, which limits firms'
ability to communicate or exchange bribes, may thus limit productive efficiency without
affecting prices.").
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and procurement markets posing a risk of collusion and econometrically
analyze the bid data for evidence of collusion. 80
Proper risk assessment should establish enforcement priorities based
on factors linked to the likelihood of collusion and the social cost from
collusion in the affected markets. The traditional list of structural factors
that facilitate collusion in posted-price markets is a good starting point:
high concentration, entry barriers, repeated interactions among firms,
homogeneous products, etc.8l In addition, public enforcers should monitor ascending bid auctions more closely because cartels are more stable
and profitable at such auctions.82 In terms of social cost, the obvious
starting point is the size of the market-larger markets deserve more
scrutiny.
C. ENFORCEMENT BY COMPETITORS

Good antitrust policy augments public antitrust enforcement with
private enforcement because private enforcers sometimes have better
information or incentives than public enforcers.83 Antitrust law carefully
screens potential private plaintiffs through standing rules that help assure
a plaintiff indeed has proper incentives and good information. 84
80 Antitrust enforcement agencies work with other government agencies, and especially
with procurement officials, to check for bid rigging. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E.

KOVACIC &JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND

PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 972 (2002). It may be possible for sophisticated rings
to hide collusion by carefully coordinating their bids, but previous rings have not been
so cagey. See Bajari & Summers, supra note 78, at 163-64 (analysis shows that colluding
bidders were not sophisticated enough to hide collusion from econometric scrutiny). But
see Davis & Wilson, supra note 70, at 213 (citing a mixed view among antitrust economists
as to whether collusion enforcement is worth the bother).
81 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 144-52.
12
An argument to the contrary holds that sealed-bid auctions should be a higher priority
because collusion causes more social harm at sealed-bid auctions. That claim is plausible
because the ring shades its bid at a sealed-bid auction and, therefore, it may lose an item
to a non-colluding bidder even though the non-colluding bidder has a lower valuation
for the item than the ring member with the highest valuation. We are not persuaded by
this argument because revenue loss is likely to be the main source of inefficiency for many
auctions (fewer items brought to the market in the long run and revenue shortfalls made
up by distortionary taxes); the higher risk of successful collusion at the English auction
could make the expected social cost higher even if the efficiency cost is lower ex post.
Finally, Marshall and Marx have shown that collusion at English auctions may cause
inefficient assignment of an item. See Marshall & Marx, supra note 9. The inefficiency
arises because ring members are reluctant to disclose their true valuations to each other
during the auction because that undermines their ability to claim rents after the auction
when the ring divides the collusive gain. Id.
13Kovacic, supra note 71, at 774-76 (private monitoring helps uncover carefully concealed collusion, private parties have the best information and possibly better incentives
than public enforcers).
84 See generally Blair & Harrison, supra note 19; Brodley, supra note 19.
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Auctioneers and procurers are the natural candidates to bring private
suits against collusion, but sometimes they have relatively weak incentives
or poor information. Many auctioneers and/or procurers are government
officials, who may not have strong incentives to monitor and challenge
collusion. 85 Furthermore, detection may be difficult even for highly motivated auctioneers. Unlike other torts, the victim may not recognize her
injury. An auctioneer can recognize a low winning bid, and a procurer
can recognize a high winning bid, but not know whether it was caused
by collusion or simply unfavorable demand or cost conditions.
Private enforcement by competitors against horizontal restraints is
severely limited by antitrust standing doctrines.8 6 Competitors are potentially good candidates to be effective private attorneys general in the
anti-collusion realm because they are likely to have good information
about collusion.8 7 Antitrust law is cautious, though, because competitors'
incentives to bring suit may not align very closely with the social incentives
to bring suit. Consider, for example, a posted-price market in which
firms A, B, and C are competitors. A conspiracy between A and B to raise
prices helps C even if C is excluded from the agreement. C would profit
from the conspiracy by increasing its price or output. C has nothing to
gain by challenging naked price fixing by its rivals and would only bring
such a suit for opportunistic or anticompetitive reasons. C should be
denied standing to promote judicial economy and reduce vexatious
litigation. 88
This argument against competitor standing was developed in the
posted-price context, but Judge Posner recently extended it to bidder
collusion.89 JTC Petroleum Co. v. PiasaMotor Fuels, Inc. raised the question
of whether a firm has standing to sue competitors for bid rigging. Judge
Posner explained that normally a competitor should not have standing:
85 SeeRobert

C. Marshall, MichaelJ. Meurer &Jean-Fran4ois Richard, The PrivateAttorney

General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1, 3 (1991).
86 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 484 (1977) (developing
the antitrust injury requirement). A cartel member qualifies for antitrust standing if it
can demonstrate antitrust injury and satisfy the other factors listed in Associated General
Contractors. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 540-45 (1983) (standing should be denied when the alleged injury is too
indirect or speculative or when it is difficult to identify and apportion damages); see also
Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof'I Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 68 (2d Cir. 1988).
87There are many examples of successful bidding rings that did not include all the
members of a market. See generally Bajari & Garrett, supra note 78 (discussing examples
of less-than-all-inclusive bidder collusion).
88See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28
J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985).
9
8 JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999)..
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A conspiracy of a firm's competitors to [raise prices or allocate customers] could only help the firm, by providing an umbrella under which
it could sell a large quantity at a supracompetitive price generating
supracompetitive profits just by setting price in between the conspirators' price and the lower, 90competitive price that would prevail in the
absence of the conspiracy.
In an auction setting in which bidders have independent valuations,
collusion by a bidder's rivals typically helps (or has no effect on) a noncolluding bidder provided the auctioneer does not behave strategically.
At a first-price sealed-bid auction the colluding bidders shade their highest bid (and obviously their complementary bids) more than would
comparable noncooperative bidders. The effect is reduced expected
revenue to the auctioneer and higher expected profit to both colluders
and non-colluders. 9' The non-colluders profit from collusion because
they win with higher probability at any given bid. Nevertheless, Judge
Posner found that standing was appropriate in JTC Petroleum because
the plaintiff plausibly alleged that its competitors had conspired with
upstream suppliers to deny the plaintiff a cheap supply of input and,
92
thereby, exclude the plaintiff from the market. In other words, a plaintiff firm should have standing when incumbent colluding firms in the
market use coordinated exclusionary tactics to deny the plaintiff entry

to the market.

93

90Id. at 777-78.
91See Robert C. Marshall, MichaelJ. Meurer, Jean-Fran~ois Richard & Walter Stromquist,
Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions, 7 GAMES & EcON. BEHAV. 193 (1994).
In the model in that article there are five bidders, who each independently draw a valuation
from the uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1]. In a first-price auction when all
bidders act noncooperatively, the expected auctioneer revenue is .6666, and each bidder
gets an expected profit of .0333. These numbers are compared to the cases when two,
three, four, or five of the bidders collude. In these cases the auctioneer's expected revenue
falls to .6510 with two colluders, .6089 with three, .5057 with four, and .0000 with five.
The expected profit of cartel members rises to .0352 with two colluders, .0406 with three,
.0567 with four, and .1667 with five. Significantly, excluded bidders enjoy even greater
benefits from collusion. Their expected profits rise to .0371 with two colluders, .0488 with
three, and .0860 with four. For a second-price (or English) auction the numbers are .6667,
.6501, .6001, .4667, and .0000 for the auctioneer's expected profit in the face of increasing
collusion. The numbers for the cartel members are .0417, .0556, .0833, and .1667 for
cartels with two, three, four, and five members. The expected profit for excluded bidders
is constant at .0333 regardless of the number of colluding bidders. These results are drawn
from Tables 3 and 4, Marshall et al., supra.
92
JTC Petroleum, 190 F.3d at 778 ("JTC, a maverick, was a threat to the cartel-but only
if it could find a source of supply of emulsified asphalt. The claim is that the applicators
got the producers to deny JTC this essential input into its business, and as a result
injured it.").
91Competitors can use the same theory to gain standing to challenge collusion or
mergers in posted-price or other market settings. See Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l
Prof I Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 71-74 (2d Cir. 1988); Brodley, supra note 19, at 46,
52 (emphasizing that colluding firms may attempt to exclude a maverick competitor); id.
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The alleged collusion inJTC Petroleumoccurred ata sealed-bid highway
construction procurement, 94 a market with characteristics similar to the
market in Addyston Pipe, and similar to most posted-price markets. The
rationale for limiting standing to competitors threatened with exclusion
makes sense in that context. However, we should be careful not to
applyJTCPetroleumtoo broadly because competitors of colluding bidders
sometimes deserve standing even absent a threat of exclusion. Bidder
collusion may result in a non-colluding competitor suffering antitrust
injury even in the absence of exclusionary conduct. The harm to the
non-colluding bidder flows either from the strategic behavior of the
auctioneer or from the presence of private information about a common
value. These factors often distinguish auction markets from posted-price
markets and should be accounted for when making antitrust policy.
A bidder at an oral auction does not benefit and may be harmed when
other bidders collude. The colluding bidders stand ready to bid up to
the highest valuation of any cartel member-this is exactly the way
the cartel bidders would act noncooperatively. In addition, suspected
collusion by bidders A and B may elicit a response from the auctioneer
that hurts bidder C. For example, an auctioneer might withhold items
from sale or strategically use a reserve price. Thus, non-colluding bidders
in an oral auction may suffer as an unavoidable effect of strategic behavior
by the auctioneer to discourage collusion.
To illustrate how the use a reserve price to combat collusion injures
a non-colluding bidder, consider an English auction with three bidders
in which each bidder has a probability of 1/5 of having a valuation of
100, 104, 118, 125, or 240. The item has no value to the auctioneer. The
auctioneer and all bidders know this information, but each bidder's
independent valuation is private information. With noncooperative
behavior, the auctioneer optimally sets a reserve of 100 and sells the
item (with probability one) to the highest value bidder at the second
highest value.
Now suppose two of the three bidders collude, and collusion occurs
before valuations are known. The reserve price which maximizes revenue
for the seller is 118. Even with this reserve, coalition members have
higher expected profit than they would by acting noncooperatively. In
at 59 (mavericks are especially good candidates for merger challenges);Jonathan B. Baker,
Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust
Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 135 (2002).
94
JTCPetroleum,190 F.3d at 777 ("The plaintiff presented evidence both that the applicator defendants had agreed not to compete with one another in bidding on local government contracts and that the producers had agreed not to compete among each other
either....").
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contrast, the excluded bidder never benefits from collusion and the
implied higher reserve, and may be strictly worse off. For example, if
the non-colluding bidder has a valuation of 104, and the two colluding
bidders each have valuations of 100, then there is no award and no
profit because the seller's strategic reserve is 118, whereas, with noncollusive bidding, the reserve price is 100, and the bidder with valuation
of 104 would have won the item for a price of 100 and earned a profit
of 4. Additionally, there are cases in which the price paid by the noncolluding bidder is raised to the reserve of 118, when it would have been
either 100 or 104 in the noncooperative setting. Collusion also reduces
the expected profit to the auctioneer, and the higher reserve leads to
her inefficient retention of the item when all bidders have values below
118. Although they have different complaints, both the auctioneer and
excluded bidder oppose collusion. In such a circumstance, standing for
the excluded bidder makes sense.
In the common values framework competitor standing may be appropriate even without strategic behavior by the auctioneer. The key factor
is the interaction of collusion and the winner's curse. Economic theory
shows that informational asymmetry determines the distribution of profit
in a common value setting. 95 If a given bidder's information is a strict
subset of any other bidder's information, then the given bidder cannot
make a positive return. When collusion exacerbates the informational
disadvantage of a non-colluding bidder, it is likely that both the auctioneer and the excluded bidder will suffer. To illustrate, consider three
bidders with different information about the underlying common value
of an item for sale. The bidders hold overlapping and equally valuable
information. Bidding noncooperatively they earn the same positive
expected return. Suppose that two of the bidders can collude and pool
their information. Furthermore, assume that by pooling their information they jointly know everything the excluded bidder knows plus some
additional information. Then the excluded bidder is beset by an aggravated winner's curse. Her expected return falls to zero. 96 This harm to
11See

Marshall & Meurer, supra note 2, at 352-53.
a single object for sale that consists of three separate and distinct components.
Each component has a value of zero with probability p and value V with probability i-p.
Bidder A observes the value of components 1 and 2, bidder B observes the value of
components 2 and 3, and bidder C observes the value of components I and 3. Suppose
the auction is second price and the auctioneer sets a reserve of zero. Then a symmetric
equilibrium has a bidder bid zero if they observe two zeros, V if they observe one zero
and one V, and 3V if they see two Vs. Note that bidders earn a positive payoff when they
observe two Vs and the other bidders each observe one V. All other circumstances result
in a zero payoff. Now, suppose bidders B and C collude. Also, suppose that they can
make the object worth a very small amount more, e, by pooling their information. Then
equilibrium behavior involves bidder A bidding zero when they see two zeros, bidding V
96 Consider
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the excluded bidder coincides with harm to the auctioneer in the form
of an expected revenue loss because of less aggressive bidding by all three
bidders. Again, standing is warranted for an excluded bidder because the
private and social incentives for litigation are closely aligned.9 7
Both strategic behavior by the auctioneer and problems created by
the winner's curse possibly harmed bidders who were excluded from
the used machinery ring. Recall the ring consisted of dealers who would
buy machinery for resale to an end-user. Typically, the machinery would
be refurbished before resale. The dealers excluded end-users and brokers
from the ring. End-users would buy machinery to make a product. 9
Brokers would buy machinery for immediate resale to end-user customers
when the brokers had standing orders.
There are several reasons that end-users were never invited to join.
First, although an end-user might have been well-informed about the
machinery specific to his production facility, such a bidder lacked the
breadth of knowledge and expertise that machinery dealers possessed.
Consequently, whereas an end-user might be valuable for reducing the
price paid on a few machines, for all other machines they were of no
value. It is disruptive to share the collusive gain with bidders who make
no contribution to that gain. Second, end-users were infrequent auction
attendees. If after winning an item at the main auction an end-user
decided not to offer it for sale at the knockout there were few ways for
when they see one zero and one V, and bidding 2V when they see two Vs. The coalition,
knowing the true value, bids it (e when seeing three zeros, V + e when seeing one V, 2V+e
when seeing two Vs, 3V + e when seeing three Vs). The excluded bidder earns a zero
profit in the face of collusion. The auctioneer is hurt as well. Cf Paul Klemperer, Auction
Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13J. EcoN. SuRvs. 227, 236-37 (1999) (a slight asymmetry
in common values setting hurts revenue because a big winner's curse afflicts the disadvantaged party).
97In contrast, if relatively uninformed bidders collude in a common values setting this
may raise expected revenue to the auctioneer because it reduces the effect of the winner's
curse. For example, suppose bidder A is fully informed about the value of an item, and
B and C have partial information about the item. The partially informed bidders will bid
weakly because of the winner's curse, and revenue will be low. Suppose B and C collude
and pool their information and thereby become fully informed. The colluding pair will
be on equal footing with bidder A, and the winning bid will match the value of the item.
The non-colluding bidder A would be harmed by this collusion, but should not be granted
standing because the collusion raises the auctioneer's revenue.
98Several factors shape end-user demand for used as opposed to new machinery. The
more obvious factors are apparent to a reader who considers why someone buys a used
car instead of a new one. Demand for machine tools is sensitive to the business cycle.
Producers of machine tools will quickly deplete their inventories in times of economic
expansion. Users will then be left with two options-wait in queue for a new machine to
be produced, or purchase the productive capacity in the used market. But the used
machinery market is relatively robust to the business cycle. In a downturn, businesses that
are liquidity constrained often will opt to purchase in the cheaper used market than buy
a new machine.
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the ring to punish him. On the other hand, if a dealer tried this he
would face temporary expulsion from the ring or demotion in terms of
his nesting level. 99 Third, dealers clearly saw that it was not in their best
long-run interest to make auction attendance profitable for end-users.
Exclusion from rings facilitated this.
The exclusion of brokers involves more subtle issues. Because brokers
bid on machines for which they had standing orders from customers,
all other machines were of no value to them. In contrast, dealers typically
bought machines for inventory. So, it was common knowledge that a
broker with a customer would almost always be willing to pay more for
a machine than a dealer because the dealer needed to account for
inventory costs in formulating a valuation and bid. If a broker started
bidding at a knockout, the broker would be run up by the dealers as
the latter tried to extract the surplus of the broker. Consequently, when
a broker had a customer for a machine, he would prefer to bid noncooperatively at the main auction. If a broker had no orders for machines,
then he would want tojoin the coalition to receive a share of the bonus
money. Therefore, if a broker was asked to join a ring and responded
affirmatively, the coalition did not want him, and, if he responded negatively, the ring did want him. As a result, brokers were never asked to
join the ring.
End-users and brokers were, at times, harmed by the presence of a
ring because of an auctioneer's response to the ring. Auctioneers would
raise the reserve price to strategically counter the collusion but, by doing
so, they risked not selling items that end-users or brokers might have
won had a lower reserve been in place.100 Beyond the harm they encountered from the presence of the ring, brokers were good candidates as
private attorneys general (relative to end-users) because they interacted
frequently with dealers and had a reasonable understanding of the relationships among dealers.

99A given dealer typically had several machines in inventory that were co-owned with
many different dealers. The warehousing dealer had substantial latitude in determining
the final transaction price for the machine. The true final transaction prices were not
verifiable. This provided dealers with an additional mechanism for punishing deviant
ring bidders.
100Auctioneers sometimes use a protecting bidder who will bid for an item if the apparent
winning bid is too low. The auctioneer will compensate the protecting bidder for implementing what is essentially a reserve policy. Other auctioneers combat collusion by using
an unannounced reserve, i.e., simply reserving the right not to make an award. A different
strategy that might benefit a non-colluding bidder is to use a "quick knock," whereby the
auctioneer ends the auction early with a quick knock of his hammer and an award to a
bidder who, the auctioneer believes, is not part of the ring.
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V. AUCTION DESIGN
Good auction design complements antitrust enforcement, and both
play a role in deterring bidder collusion, 1 1 but auction design balances
other concerns as well. Besides collusion, an auction designer considers
risk aversion, asymmetries in the distribution of valuations, correlation
of valuations, liquidity constraints, and other factors when selecting an
auction format. 10 2 Certain factors favor the choice of a sealed-bid auction
to maximize revenue or total surplus, and other factors favor the English
auction. Auction designers who are especially worried about collusion
should choose the first-price sealed-bid format rather than the English
or some other ascending bid format. 03
A private sector auctioneer will typically design an auction to maximize
expected revenue. Discouraging collusion aids revenue maximization
but an optimal auction sometimes tolerates an increased risk of collusion
to encourage more aggressive bidding. For example, an English auction
may be preferred over a sealed-bid auction in a common values environment because the winner's curse depresses revenue more at a sealedbid auction than an English auction. 10 4 An auctioneer might reasonably
conclude that the greater risk of collusion from use of the English
auction would have a smaller expected impact on revenue than the
expected impact of the winner's curse.
101See Klemperer, supranote 2, at 170, 172 (auction design is more effective in constraining collusion than antitrust enforcement); Owen M. Kendler, Comment, Auction Theory
Can Complement Competition Law: Preventing Collusion in Europe's 3G Spectrum Allocation, 23
U. PA.J. INT'L EcON. L. 153, 160-61 (2002).
102Expected revenue is higher at a sealed-bid auction with risk-averse bidders. Expected
revenue is higher at an English auction given correlated values. See Klemperer, supra note
96, at 234-35. Certain asymmetries in the independent private values environment can
make the sealed-bid auction more profitable and others make the English auction more
profitable. See Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, Asymmetric Auctions, 67 REv. ECON. STUD.
413 (2000).
101See supra text accompanying notes 26-35. See also Klemperer, supra note 2, at 170,
179; Marshall & Marx, supra note 10. In the spectrum auctions, Klemperer argues that
auction designers should be especially mindful of collusion and other sorts of anticompetitive behavior. Klemperer, supra note 2, at 170 (Good auction design requires
attention to collusion, entry-deterring, and predatory behavior. These issues are more
important than the standard concerns of auction theorists: risk aversion, correlation of
information, budget constraints, and complementarities.)
104Paul R. Milgrom & RobertJ. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1095 (1982) ("[W]hen bidders are uncertain about their value
estimates, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent; the English auction
generally leads to larger expected prices. One explanation of this inequality is that when
bidders are uncertain about their valuations, they can acquire useful information by
scrutinizing the bidding behavior of their competitors during the course of an English
auction. That extra information weakens the winner's curse and leads to more aggressive
bidding in the English auction, which accounts for the higher expected price.").
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The government should choose an auction design that maximizes
expected social welfare. The government should be conscious of the
welfare losses from taxation and, therefore, strive to maximize revenue
at auctions and minimize costs at procurements. °5 But the government
should also strive to maximize the size of the pie by assuring that auctions
allocate items to the highest valuation bidders and procurements award
contracts to the most efficient producer. Sometimes, productive or allocative efficiency clash with revenue maximization or cost minimization.
Consider, for example, an asymmetric independent private values auction in which certain bidders draw their valuations from more favorable
distributions than other bidders. The strong bidders tend to shade their
bids more than the weak bidders, so it is possible for a weak bidder with
a lower valuation to win a sealed-bid auction. In contrast, the bidder
with the higher valuation always wins at the English auction; therefore,
the English auction achieves greater allocative efficiency. Nevertheless,
0 6
the sealed-bid auction may yield greater expected revenue.1
A.

SPECTRUM AUCTIONS

A relatively successful experiment in auction design was undertaken
by the FCC in the mid-1990s to award electromagnetic spectrum for
various telecommunications applications. Congress called on the FCC
to use auctions because of the disappointing earlier experience with a
spectrum lottery.107 With the advice of renowned microeconomic theorists, the FCC devised a simultaneous, ascending bid auction. 08 The FCC
divided the country into regions and offered multiple licenses in each
region. Ascending bids were submitted simultaneously for all licenses,
and rounds of bidding continued until all bids stopped ascending. 10 9
See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 169 (the revenue difference between good or bad
105
auction design can be substantial; perhaps billions of dollars of government revenue are
at stake in telecommunications auctions).
106Regardless of collusion risk, aggressive bidding by weak bidders may increase revenue
and may offset the allocative inefficiency. See Klemperer, supra note 96, at 236.
107Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC
License Auctions Take 67 Years? 41 J.L. & ECON. 529,530 (1998). Qualification for the lottery
was rather easy and as a result much of the spectrum was allocated to speculators. The
inefficiency of the initial allocations delayed the commercial introduction of cellular
technology for at least 2 years. Id. at 533 ("Between $500 million and $1 billion in wasteful
rent-seeking was likely expended on the cellular lotteries, while several times this sum was
lost for the U.S. Treasury."). In the wake of this experience, Congress insisted the FCC
determine an efficient method of allocating spectrum. See Preston McAfee & John
McMillan, Analyzing the Airwaves Auction, 10J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 159, 160.
("In the 1993 legislation authorizing the FCC to hold auctions, Congress charged the FCC
with encouraging an 'efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum."').
108See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107, at 160.
100The auction rules included "activity rules," which required potential buyers to bid
on a certain number of licenses in every round. Without the activity rules, the ascending

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72

The auctions generated substantial revenue, and achieved a relatively
efficient allocation of spectrum.110 The auction designers chose the simultaneous ascending bid auction to achieve efficiency in the presence of
complementarities and the winner's curse. Complementarities can arise
because licenses covering neighboring geographic areas are likely to be
more valuable if a bidder wins a license in each area. The auction format
allowed bidders to acquire efficient bundles of licenses and also helped
dampen the winner's curse."' In some markets, inefficient allocation at
the auction is not a serious problem because resale moves items to the
highest value user. But the experience with spectrum lotteries used prior
to 1993 suggested that redistributing licenses after the auction would be
2
costly and slow."
The success of the first set of FCC spectrum auctions influenced
several European telecommunications agencies to conduct simultaneous
ascending bid auctions. Most of the auctions were not as successful in
3
terms of revenue generation because collusion was more of a problem."
Collusion became apparent in subsequent FCC auctions as well, and it
4
significantly reduced revenue."
bid auctions would need to be terminated at some arbitrary date, which would make the
auction strategically similar to a first-price sealed-bid auction. Id.
"n0See Patrick S. Moreton & Pablo T. Spiller, What's in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in
the Federal Communications Commission's Broadband Personal Communication Service Spectrum
Auctions, 41J.L. & ECON. 677, 678 (1998) (two broadband auctions conducted in the mid1990s raised more than $17 billion in revenue for the U.S. Treasury); id. at 679 (finding
empirical evidence of synergies in PCS licenses, and "evidence that some interlicense
synergies may have reduced the size of winning bids, possibly by affecting the degree of
competition for a license"); Peter Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41
J.L. & EcON. 727, 728 (1998) (the FCC auctions achieved efficient license assignment).
"n See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107, at 161-62. They explain:
The ascending bids let bidders see how highly their rivals value each license
and which aggregations they are seeking. By the time equilibrium is approached,
each bidding firm knows whether it is likely to be able to construct its preferred
aggregation and roughly how much it is going to cost. With all licenses open for
bidding simultaneously, a bidder has flexibility to seek whatever license aggregation it wishes, as well as to switch to a back-up aggregation if its first-choice
aggregation becomes too expensive.
Id. at 161.
12 See id. at 163 (trading after the auction would correct inefficient initial allocation,
but it could be costly and incomplete); Cramton, supranote 110, at 727-28 (same).
"I See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 170; Kendler, supra note 101, at 182 (joint ventures
in the Dutch 3G auction reduced the number of major bidders so itjust equaled the number
of licenses). Klemperer warns that predation is also a problem in repeated ascending bid
auctions. See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 174.
"I See Peter Cramton &Jesse A. Schwartz, Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions,
1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1 (2002), available at http://www.be
press.com/bejeap ("We find that six of the 153 bidders in the DEF auction regularly
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The factors that make the spectrum auctions allocatively efficient also
make them especially vulnerable to collusion. The transparency and
frequency of the bidding aids information flow, as well as diminishing
problems from complementarities and the winner's curse. But these
properties also facilitate communication within rings, make cheating
easier to detect, and make punishment easier. During the early rounds
of certain FCC spectrum auctions, bidders encoded messages in their
bids. The last several digits of each bid were of little consequence to the
bidders, so they allegedly used these digits to communicate with their
rivals and suppress competition."15 Furthermore, the spectrum auctions
share a pro-collusive feature with English auctions; a ring's chosen winner does not have to shade its bid, so cheating is not a problem.
Regardless of whether the auction designer chooses a sealed-bid or
ascending bid 16 auction, there are several measures that can reduce the
risk of collusion. Rigorous enforcement of antitrust law is the most
obvious.1' 7 In addition, auction design choices can reduce the risk by
signaled using code bids or retaliating bids. These bidders won 476 of the 1,479 licenses
for sale in the auction, or about 40% of the available spectrum in terms of population
covered.").
115See News Release, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Justice Department Sues
Three Firms over FCC Auction Practices (Nov. 10, 1998), available at 1998 WL 792334 (DOJ
filed suit against three firms that allegedly used coded bids to collude at a PCS auction);
United States v. Mercury PCS II, L.L.C., No. 98-2751, 1999 WL 1425379 (D.D.C. Apr. 29,
1999) (consent agreement barring signaling through bids at FCC auctions); Cramton &
Schwartz, supranote 114, at 3 ("[W]e believe that bidders in the DEF auction took advantage
of signaling opportunities to coordinate how to assign the licenses."); Klemperer, supra
note 2, at 170-71 (European bidders have signaled each other to facilitate collusion by
using early bids to communicate in multi-unit ascending bids auctions). A startling example
occurred when U.S. West encoded the number indicating the Rochester, Minnesota,
region into a couple of its bids. Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 114, at 4-5. The FCC
designated Rochester as 378D. Apparently, U.S. West wanted to dissuade McLeod from
bidding in Rochester, and U.S. West submitted bids of 62,378 and 313,378 in regions
where McLeod had been active but where U.S. West had not been active.
Collusion cases like this demonstrate the difficulty in proving agreement as opposed to
unilateral action. Nevertheless, the government had some success in the PCS auctions,
and success in a similar case involving the airline industry. See United States v. Airline
Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1993); United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co.,
No. 92-2854, 1994 WL 502091, 1994 WL 454730 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1994) (settlement with
remaining defendants) ;Justice Department's Competitive Impact Statement at 15, United
States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1994 WL 454730 (D.D.C. 1994) (No. 92-2854) (fare
notifications "intended to send a message" to a competitor not consumers). Regardless,
a unilateral message sent through the bids may violate Section 5 of the FTC Act.
116 See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 179 (explaining methods of improving ascending bid
auctions to make them less vulnerable to collusion); Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 114,
at 14-15 (same).
11
7 Antitrust enforcement against collusion in spectrum auctions has been too weak,
especially in Europe. See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 183.
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encouraging entry, restricting the ability of bidders to communicate,
and using a reserve policy and related strategic tactics." 8 An auctioneer
can encourage entry of marginal bidders by adjusting their bids to favor
them,"19 by gathering information and disseminating it to bidders (which
eases the winner's curse for less informed bidders),120 or by encouraging
joint bidding.' 21 However, auctioneers and auction designers should
guard against the use of joint bidding as a tool for collusion. The FCC
strongly encouraged firms to form joint ventures, especially designated
entities, 122 but it also wisely required ventures be formed by a specific
date prior to the auction. 23 A Swiss spectrum auction did not set a
deadline for joint ventures, last-minute joint ventures essentially elimi124
nated competition, and it was too late for other bidders to enter.
Stringent reserve price policies and suppression of information about
bidders help reduce the expected harm from collusion, but these policies
might be unattractive because of offsetting costs. Usually the reserve
price is preannounced, but some auctioneers reserve the right to refuse
to make an award on any grounds and use that discretion to combat
suspected collusion. 21 5 Because a binding reserve means the auctioneer
inefficiently retains the item up for auction, an optimal reserve balances
the benefits of higher revenue from more aggressive bidding against the
risk of no award. 126 Suppressing the identity of bids and bidders makes
118McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107, at 170 (a maverick bidder, ALAACR, entered
broadband markets that appeared under-priced); Klemperer, supra note 96, at 239 (the
auctioneer gains more from attracting bidders than investing in a better auction design).
119Various government auctions and procurements have used scoring systems that
favored small or disadvantaged businesses. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction
Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC IncreasedAuction Competition, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 761 (1996). Bias in favor of marginal bidders can increase auction revenue and
decrease procurement cost.
120See Marshall & Meurer, supra note 2, at 353-54.
121Kendler, supra note 101, at 181 (possibly procompetitive joint ventures that increase
competition); Hendricks et al., supra note 41, at 27 (no evidence that joint bidding in
one area led to coordinated bidding in other areas).
122Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 114, at 15 (preferences for small bidders encourages entry).
123Bidders were provided an explicit opportunity to form and register joint ventures
prior to the auction. "
124Klemperer, supra note 2, at 174.
125See United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1970) (a buyer rejected
all bids in a procurement; the government later proved the bidders were colluding);
Klemperer, supra note 2, at 175 (a reserve price that was too low was extremely costly to
the Swiss government in a telecommunications auction). Auctioneers profitably use reserves
even when they do not suspect collusion; they use the reserve to stimulate higher bidding.
121Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 114, at 15 (high reserve prices mitigate harm from
collusion but the potential for the reserve to bind makes this ambiguous). For a clear
example of the efficiency cost of retaining an item, consider auctions for perishable
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127
it harder for a ring to form and harder for a ring to detect defection.
However, designers of the spectrum auction believed suppression of this
information would have made it harder for bidders to extract information
from bids-this information extraction diminished the winner's curse
and improved aggregation of neighboring licenses in the spectrum
128
auctions.

B.

TIMBER AUCTIONS

U.S. Forest Service auctions offer another opportunity to consider
auction design in the face of possible bidder collusion. 129 Historically,
the Forest Service has sold tracts of timber from National Forests to mills
and logging firms using both English and sealed-bid auctions. 10 Despite
longstanding suspicion of widespread collusion, successful prosecution
has proven difficult. 31 Like used machinery auctions, timber auctions
involve specialized bidders, 3 2 who often make substantial investments
gathering information about heterogeneous timber tracts. Unlike the
machinery auctions, the auctioneer (Forest Service) actively varies the
auction design with an eye on possible collusion. 133 Furthermore, the
Forest Service is aware of the importance of private information about
the common value of the tracts and produces and disseminates information in order to mitigate the effect of the winner's curse.
The timber auctions are similar in many ways to off-shore oil tract
auctions. Valuations for bidders at both auctions exhibit features of the
independent private values model because bidders differ in terms of
extraction or harvesting costs. But both auctions also exhibit features of
commodities like fish or flowers. If the auctioneer actually retains those items, there could
be a total loss of value.
127Id. at 14. When bidder information is fully revealed, it is easier for firms to signal
the way U.S. West apparently did at the PCS auction. And because spectrum auctions may
take several weeks to complete, bidders can enter into a subcontracting agreement on a
totally unrelated project, as a method of hiding side payments.
128McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107, at 170.
129A detailed description of Forest Service transactions in the timber industry can be
found in Laura H. Baldwin, Robert C. Marshall &Jean-Franois Richard, Bidder Collusion
at Forest Timber Auctions, 105 J. POL. ECON. 657 (1997).
30From 1976-1990 the Forest Service conducted "well over a thousand" auctions per
year in the northern and western U.S., generating about $1 billion per year in revenue.
Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber
Auctions, 109J. POL. ECON. 375, 379 (2001).
131 Baldwin et al., supra note 129, at 658.
132See Philip A. Haile, Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service
Timber Sales, 91 Am. EcON. Rav. 399, 401 (2001) (most bidders represent mills that tend
to specialize in particular types of timber).
I See Athey & Levin, supra note 130, at 380 (the Forest Service decides whether to use
an oral or sealed-bid auction based on expected competition and composition of tract).
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the common values model. Oil companies face shared uncertainty about
the amount of oil available at a tract. Timber bidders face shared uncer34
tainty about the quality and quantity of timber on a given acreage.1
Timber auction winners resell much of the timber they harvest; also,
they often subcontract part of the harvest, or even sell the entire harvesting contract. 13 5 Because ancient growth timber is so heterogeneous,
historically mills have been extremely specialized. 3 6 With such specialization, a timber tract often appears to be a large pie to the firms in the
area. The winner of a tract wants certain slices with certain logs suitable
for its production process. The rest are resold to the firms that value
them most highly. Resale makes bidders' valuations more correlated and
aggravates the winner's curse; resale also facilitates collusion by providing
a way to camouflage side-payments. If colluding bidders are specialized
in different types of timber, then enforcement authorities will have a
difficult time determining the competitive resale price. A savvy coalition
can pay a depressed price for the timber at the auction and share the
collusive gain through the resale market. The auction winner can make
implicit side-payments by selling timber in the secondary market at favor37
able prices to colluding mills.
Collusion is likely to be common in timber auctions because of the
prevalence of English auctions,'3 8 the frequency of the auctions, and
opportunities to disguise side-payments through subcontracts and
resale. 3 9 Nevertheless, English auctions might be attractive to the Forest
Service given the common value component inherent in many timber
auctions. 4° The Forest Service sometimes chooses sealed-bid auctions
rather than English auctions when it is especially worried about collusion.
The Forest Service probably should take stronger action to mitigate the
I-"
Certain timber auctions are best modeled as independent private values; other auctions have a substantial common values component. See Athey & Levin, supra note 130,
at 398 (evidence of common values).
135
Haile, supra note 132, at 401.
136Some mills handle only a certain peeler grade of Douglas fir for veneers. Others
produce clear sawtimbers. Still other mills are set up to process ancient trees that are
substantially rotten.
137In contrast, if the bidders do not specialize, resale could still be used to share collusive
gains, but enforcement authorities will find it far easier to establish market prices and
thereby determine if interfirm exchanges have occurred at depressed prices.
138Haile, supra note 132, at 401 (English auctions are more common than sealed-bid
timber auctions).
139 Id. at 402 (the active resale market facilitates collusion).
140 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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winner's curse, and then it could move more aggressively toward sealedbid auctions.
Before explaining how the Forest Service can mitigate the winner's
curse, we need to say a bit more about the informational setting of
timber auctions. The ability to survey a 200-acre tract of ancient growth
timber and accurately estimate the quantity of merchantable timber by
species and the quality of that timber takes many years to develop. The
ability to accurately estimate quality implies that a firm can sell logs
from a tract to other firms whose production facilities are best suited to
handling these logs. The Forest Service usually gathers information about
a tract by performing a "cruise" of the tract. They disclose this information to bidders, and then bidders usually conduct an independent
cruise. 4 1 The bidders in a given area are usually much better at evaluating
timber quality and quantity than the Forest Service. This creates an
incentive for collusion among those bidders to protect their informa142
tional advantage.
The Forest Service should take a simple step to diminish this incentive
to collude. Historically, the information about log quality and quantity
is collected by the Forest Service during harvest, but the quality information is not made available to the general bidding public. This policy
creates an information rent for the winning bidder. If an adjacent tract
is brought up for sale, then the current winner will have a significant
advantage over competitors because it knows the quality of the timber
in that drainage area. If two bidders have bought tracts nearby a third
newly announced sale, then they will have an incentive to collude so as
to preserve their informational rents. However, this informational rent
and the corresponding incentive for collusion have been created by
the Forest Service. If the Forest Service would simply make the quality
information publicly available, then no such motivation for collusion
143
would exist.
141See

Athey & Levin, supra note 130, at 381 (companies invest in private cruises).

142Many mills specialize in the use of a given factor input but compete in competitive

output markets (veneers, sawtimbers, plywood). This makes the factor input market an
important source of rents. But the evidence of collusion developed so far starts with the
assumption that the independent private values model is appropriate. See Baldwin et al.,
supra note 129, at 659, 688 (evidence of collusion at English auctions of timber in the
northwestern U.S.); Lance Eric Brannman, Potential Competition and Possible Collusion in
Forest Service Timber Auctions, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 730 (1996) (evidence of collusion at Forest
Service auctions); Athey & Levin, supra note 130, at 408 (evidence that "informational
rents" in scale sales "may be largely competed away").
113Besides reducing the winner's curse, these steps also tend to reduce the value of
private investment in cruising and, therefore, save society the cost of redundant information production.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A large number of questions always come to mind when considering
bidder collusion. How do members know what objects to bid on at the
auction? How high should they bid? If an item is won by a member of
a coalition, do they own it? Do they need to transfer moneys to members
of the coalition? If an item won by a member belongs to the coalition,
how is ultimate ownership determined? How is the realized collusive
gain shared among ring members? What incentives are there for cheating
on the collusive agreement? How can the coalition dissuade and/or
monitor members to deter cheating? And, how do the answers to each
of these questions depend upon the auction scheme under consideration? We hope our detailed descriptions of stable bidding rings give
antitrust lawyers some insights into these questions.
The fundamental message of this article is that the standard analysis
of cartel behavior in posted-price markets is often inadequate when
applied to collusion by bidders at an auction or procurement. Auction
schemes differ in their susceptibility to collusion, which has implications
for the allocation of enforcement resources. Auction markets often feature heterogeneous products, and bidders often expend significant
resources to understand the item being offered in order to formulate a
bid. Further, there are circumstances where non-colluding bidders are
damaged by the collusion and, therefore, should have standing. Once
policy makers recognize these differences they will be better able to
combat collusion through improved enforcement and auction design.

